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Bailey: Bailey: Mediator's Privilege

NOTES
The Mediator's Privilege: Can a
Mediator Be Compelled to Testify in
a Civil Case? California Privilege
Law Says Yes
Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation has become a popular means of resolving disputes outside the
courtroom. The focus on problem solving, instead of an adversarial "get what you
can" attitude, is appealing to participants.2 This non-confrontational approach by the
mediator allows participants to express their emotions, feelings, and desires about
the dispute. Consequently, parties tend to divulge much more, both in spoken words
and in actions, than they otherwise would in the hope of resolving the dispute.'
Parties freely divulge, though, because they expect what they say to remain
confidential.4 It is because of this that many scholars attribute the success of
mediation to the confidentiality requirement.'
Even given the expectation of confidentiality, instances arise where one or all
parties seek to compel mediation testimony. Jurisdictions differ on whether and
under what circumstances testimony may be compelled. In addition, some
commentators have noted a possible distinction between seeking general mediation
testimony and the mediator's testimony.6
In such instances, a separate
confidentiality privilege runs with the mediator, as opposed to the privilege running
with parties.' Even in jurisdictions that do not establish a distinct mediator's
privilege, there still exists concern over whether a mediator can be compelled to
testify. This is because the mediator is supposed to be viewed as impartial.8 When
courts require mediators to testify, however, their appearance of impartiality
weakens. The issue then becomes whether a mediator can be forced to testify when
one or all of the parties desire the testimony.

1. 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
2. See Kentra. infra note 56, at 720.
3. Id. at 722.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Rosenberg, infra note 142, at 159.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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In the present case, Olain v. Congress, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California has, in a precedent-setting opinion, forced a mediator
to testify in a subsequent civil procedure. 9 This Note will examine two recurring
issues regarding mediation: first, the appropriate law to be applied when a case sits
in federal court; and second, the history of the mediation privilege, the present state
of the mediation privilege within the federal and state courts, and the consequences
of the instant case.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1992, Donna Olam ("Olam") received a $187,000 loan from Congress
Mortgage ("Congress") secured by a lien on two homes.'" Olam subsequently
defaulted on this loan, whereby Congress began foreclosure proceedings. " In May
of 1993, Olam, represented by her attorney, Carl Windell, and Congress entered into
a "work-out" agreement that stayed the foreclosure proceedings. 2 In the present
case, Olam claims that although both parties signed the agreement, Windell was not
her attorney, and that she was under "extreme duress" at the time she signed the
agreement. 3 Later in 1993, Olam defaulted on the payments under the agreement,
and Congress4 informed Olam that they would once again begin foreclosure
proceedings."

In 1994, the parties began negotiations with the hope of restructuring the
payments in a manner amenable to both parties. 5 The negotiations were
successful, 6 and in October 1994, the parties entered into another signed
agreement. 7 However, Olam claims that like the 1993 agreement, she was under
"economic duress," the terms of the agreement were not explained to her by her
attorney, and she was experiencing "incapacitating medical conditions"
that kept her
8
from realizing the "nature, purpose, and effect" of the agreement.
In the present case, Olam claims a violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act
("TILA"), fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty by Congress. 9 Congress filed a
Motion to Compel Contract Arbitration pursuant to the original 1992 loan
agreement.20 Olam opposed this motion, arguing that she had not read the loan

9. 68 F.Supp. 2d 1110.

10. Id.
at 1113.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1113-14. The work-out agreement provided that renovation funds be applied to the
outstanding loan. Id. at 1113.
13. Id.
at 1114.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. ld. The terms of the agreement called for one of the homes to be sold. id. The proceeds of the
sale would be applied to the outstanding debt of the second home, thus reducing the monthly payments.
Id.
17. Id. For the signing of the 1994 agreement, Olam was represented by her attorney, Paul H.
Melbostad. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1115. Olam was represented by her attorney, Carol Johnson Lundberg, when the original
complaint was filed. Id.
20. Id.
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agreement and did not know of the arbitration requirement. 2 Congress' Motion to
Compel Arbitration was subsequently denied in 1995.22 In 1997, after the case had
appeared before two other judges, Judge Brazil was assigned the case for all further
proceedings.23 At the court's request, the parties agreed to a mediation, which was
scheduled for March of 1998.24 However, the mediation was canceled by Olam's
attorney, Phyllis Voisenat ("Voisenat"), due to communication problems between
Voisenat and Olam.2 5 At the final pretrial conference, the parties, encouraged by the
court, agreed to mediation.26
The mediation, mediated by Howard Herman, was conducted on September 9,
1998.27 The mediation went well, and at 1:00 a.m., the parties signed a
"Memorandum of Understanding" ("MOU") that gave the terms and settlement of
the mediation. Consequently, the case never proceeded to trial. 29 Approximately
seven months after the mediation, Congress filed a motion to enforce the mediation
settlement. Olam opposed this motion, through her new attorney, Terrence P.
Murphy, claiming that the MOU was unconscionable and that Olam was "incapable
31
(intellectually, emotionally, and physically) of giving legally viable consent.",
In response to the filed motion and reply, the court concluded that an evidentiary
hearing was necessary to determine what actually transpired during the mediation.32
In order to best evaluate Olam's claims, the court considered (1) the choice of law
(state or federal) regarding "to what extent, and through what procedures [the court]
may consider evidence about what occurred during the mediation"; and (2) whether,
under the applicable law, Herman, as a mediator, can be compelled to testify
regarding his "perceptions in and recollections" of the mediation." In anticipation
of the evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed to waive their mediation privilege. 4
In resolving the preceding issues, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California concluded that: (1) a district court must apply state
law regarding mediation privilege when the rule of decision of the underlying claim
is governed by state law, regardless of whether the district court's local rule
regarding mediation privilege pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) is more protective of

21. Id. The court noted that Olam's argument was partly based on her not having her reading glasses
when she signed the 1992 loan agreement. Id.
22. Id. at 1115 & n.4.
23. Id.
at 1115.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1115-16. The court noted its "disappointment" that the assigned mediator had been
inconvenienced. Id.at 1116.
26. Id.at 1116. At this time, no mediation between the parties had ever taken place. Id.

27. Id.Herman was an "extensively trained" court-appointed mediator. Id.
28. Id.
at 1117. The MOU stated that it was "intended as a binding document itself." Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
at 1117-18.
32. Id. at 1118.
33. Id.
at 1118, 1120, 1129.
34. Id.
at 1118-19. Olam waived the attomey-client privilege between her and Voisenat, her former
attorney. Id. at 1118. In addition, Olam waived any mediation privilege she had to communications
made during the mediation and to any communications she may have had with the mediator after the
mediation. Id. at 1118 & n.13. Congress agreed to a limited waiver of testimony regarding the
mediator's and Congress' interactions with Olam and her attorney. Id. at 1119.
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mediation communications; and (2) a mediator can be compelled to testify about his
observations of the mediation when (a) there exists a signed agreement of the results
of the mediation, (b) the mediator's testimony would do little or no harm to the
relationships between the mediator and a party,35 (c) the mediator's testimony is
extremely probative and crucial to the outcome of the underlying claim, and (d) the
harm caused to the interests of mediation would be little or none. 16

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Choice of Law
Before a federal court can decide the merits of a claim, the court must first
determine whether state or federal law applies. This choice of law can clearly impact
the disposition of a case, especially when a privilege issue arises. Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 ("Rule 501"), when a case is in federal court due to a federal
question, the court is required to apply the federal common law of the applicable
privilege.37 This bright-line rule is qualified, however, when the "issue governed by
State substantive law is the object of the evidence."3 As the legislative history of
Rule 501 explains, "State privilege law is not to be applied unless the matter to be
proved is an element of that state claim or defense.. . . 9 For example, in Baravati
v. Josephthal,Lyon, & Ross, Inc., the United States Court of-Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ruled that state defamation privilege law applies in a federal court because
defamation is clearly an area of state law .4 ° Therefore, it is possible, although rare,
that a case can be in federal court due to a federal question, yet still apply state
privilege law because the issue to be decided is governed by state law. 4' For
distinguishing purposes, when federal law incorporates state law, such as when state
law is used to determine damages under the Federal Torts Claim Act, a federal

35. Id. at 1134. The court noted that because all parties wanted Hennan totestify there would be less
harm to the relationships between Herman and a party than there otherwise would be if a party did not
want Herman to testify. Id.
36. Id. at 1125, 1134, 1139.
37. FED. R. EvID. 501 states:
[T]he privilege of a witness... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness ... shall be determined in accordance with State law. Id.
38. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,7058. See also Davis
v. Leal, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108-09 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that Rule 501 "does not provide that
diversity jurisdiction actions are the only actions in which state law will supply the rule of decision").
39. S.REP. No. 93-1277, at 11-12 (1974), reprintedin1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7058. See also Davis
v. Leal, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1109. The Davis court noted that if Congress had desired that state privilege
law be applied only in diversity cases, then Congress would have stated
such. Id. As it is, Congress did
not do so but instead directed that state privilege law applies when "[s]tate law supplies the rule of
decision." Id.
40. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 707 (7th Cir. 1994).
41. S.REP. No. 93-1277, at 11-12 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7058.
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action, federal privilege law still applies because the "interests of the United States"
are affected.42
Another way of expressing the prescription of Rule 501 is by determining what
law is operative. 43 A law is "operative of its own force" if the law provides the
"source of the right sued upon," commonly referred to as the rule of decision."
Therefore, when the rule of decision is state law, state privilege law is also the
applicable privilege law under Rule 501 .4'However, as noted above, when federal
law provides the rule of decision, then federal privilege law applies. 6 This balancing
between federal and state law ensures that federal interests are protected while
limiting forum shopping.47 Without Rule 501, federal courts are forced to apply state
privilege law to a federal question, which leads to inequitable and inconsistent
application of federal law.48
A wrinkle in the choice of law commentary exists with regard to the policy of
comity when federal jurisdiction is based on a federal question with additional state
claims. Some courts have found that where federal law and state law is consistent
or where no federal common law exists, state law may be applied in federal court as
a matter of comity. 49 However, recent cases express a distrust of the "application of
state law as a matter of comity policy" in federal court.5 ° Problems regarding
privileges arise because often there is no existing federal privilege law." In hopes
of circumventing the issue, courts will apply the privilege law of the state "under the
guise that it is simply being used to 'guide' development of the federal common

42. Burrows v. Redbud Community Hosp. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 606, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1998). See Federal
Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994 & Supp. 1111997). See generally Davis v. Leal, 43 F. Supp.
2d 1102, 1108-09 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (observing that an action based entirely on state law does not require
federal privilege law to be applied because there is no overriding federal interest); Menses v. United
States Postal Service, 942 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Nev. 1996) (stating that a federal court
"incorporating" state law is also described as "adopt[ing] state law").
43. Burrows, 187 F.R.D. at 608.
44. Id.
45. Id. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
46. S.REP. No. 93-1277, at 11-12 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059 (stating that
"[i]n Federal question civil cases, federally evolved rules on privilege should apply since it is Federal
policy which is being enforced").
47. Burrows, 187 F.R.D. at 608.
48. Id.
49. Seeln re March, 1994-Special Grand Jury, 897 F. Supp. 1170, 1172 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (finding that
state law can be applied as a matter of comity when there is "no substantial cost to federal substantive
and procedural policy,") (quoting Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981)); Smith
v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 668-69 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (refusing to reverse magistrate judge's ruling that
comity and the parties' expectations that state law would be applied to an issue regarding Texas
mediator's privilege).
50. See Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (overruling district court's decision to apply state mediation privilege as a matter of comity);
Jackson v. County of Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653, 654 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that federal privilege
law should not be determined by comity to the law of the forum state in a federal question case). See
also Ryan O'Dell, Note, FederalCourt Positively Adopts a FederalCommon Law Testimonial Privilege
for Mediation:Is It Justified?, 1999 J.DIsP. RESOL. 203,208 (noting that a federal court should not apply
state mediation privileges as a matter of comity).
51. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
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law." 52 However, under Jaffee v. Redmond, federal courts considering whether to
make new federal privilege law should rule under a more thorough and rigorous
analysis other than simply "comity compels adoption of state law."53 Therefore, in
federal question cases, a court must balance Rule 501 and the Jaffee analysis to
law applies, instead of adopting state privilege law as a
determine what privilege
4
matter of comity1
B. Mediator'sPrivilege
1. Civil Cases
The mediation process is primarily viewed as one of candor and trust - in
exchange for one's candor during the mediation, there is trust that what is said
during the mediation will remain confidential. 5 The widespread acceptance of
privileged mediation communications is demonstrated by the not so insignificant fact
that forty-nine states have adopted at least one statute or local court rule regarding
mediation confidentiality. 6 Two developments within the past three years have
further strengthened protection of mediation communications. First, Congress
passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 ("ADR Act"), which
"provide[s] for the confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution processes" and
"prohibit[s] disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications" in federal
district courts.57 Second, also in 1998, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California established the first-ever federal mediation privilege
in Folb v. Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health Plans." Although these two
events greatly contributed to the law regarding mediation privileges, they did little
to acknowledge the developing issue of the mediator's protection.
Although rare, instances arise where a party seeks to compel a mediator to
testify to events of a mediation. One of the earliest cases to debate the issue, NLRB
v. Macaluso, Inc., applied a balancing test to determine whether mediator testimony

52. Id. (quoting A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5434, at 488 (1980 & Supp. 1999)).
53. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1996) (outlining a four-part test to determine whether a
federal court may adopt a federal privilege). See also O'Dell, supra note 50, at 208.
54. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71.
55. James L. Knoll, Protecting Participantsin the Mediation Process: The Role of Privilege and
Immunity, 34 TORT & INS. L. J. 115, 115 (1998). See generally Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privileges
Transitionfrom Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect
Mediation Participants,the Processand the PublicInterest, 1995 J. Disp RESOL. 1, 10 (noting that one
purpose of confidential mediations is "to maintain the public's perception that individual mediators and
the mediation process are neutral and unbiased"); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Uniform Mediation Act (Proposed Official Drafts) (visited March 8, 2000),
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/med300.htm> [hereinafter U.M.A.] (noting that "candor [is]
crucial to mediation").
56. Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict for
Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and.the Duty to Report
Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 733 (providing a comprehensive list of state
statutes regarding confidentiality in the mediation process).
57. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1998).
58. 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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should be compelled. 9 In Macaluso, the Macaluso company ("Company") and
Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 ("Union") participated in collectivebargaining agreement negotiations mediated by a member of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service ("FMCS"). 60 The Union argued that three mediated
sessions produced an agreement, whereas the Company contended they had not.6'
Crucial to the Company's case was the mediator's testimony, which the Company
sought to compel. 62 The FMCS, filing amicus curiae, argued that successful
mediation was contingent on the mediator's "appearance of neutrality," and
therefore, the mediator's testimony should not be heard.63 The court noted, however,
that a "fundamental principle of Anglo-American law [is] that the public is entitled
to every person's evidence." 64 In evaluating these interests, the court stated that in
order to deny the mediator's testimony, there must exist a "public good transcending
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth., 65 The court ultimately denied compelling the mediator's testimony, stating
that mediation in labor relations was important enough that the need for neutral
mediators outweighed the benefits to the parties and the public of the mediator's
testimony. 66
At least one state court has compelled a mediator to testify in a civil case. In
McKinlay v. McKinlay, a Florida appeals court allowed a mediator to testify as to
whether the mediation produced an agreement. 67 At the end of the mediation in
McKinlay, which focused on the distribution of divorce proceedings, the mediator
checked "[A]greement signed (total resolution)" on the "Disposition of Mediation
Conference" form.68 In a letter dated the same day, the wife claimed that she was
under "severe emotional distress" and was pressured into reaching an agreement. 69
When the husband sought to enforce the terms of the agreement by calling the
mediator to testify that an agreement had been reached, the wife argued mediator
privilege under Florida's mediation confidentiality statutes. 70 The wife, in support
of denying the mediator's testimony, cited a previous Florida case which denied

59. NLRB v. Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 52.
61. Id. at 52-53.
62. Id. at 53.
63. Id. The NLRB also joined the FMCS in amicus curiae. Id.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). See
generally WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 296 (1940).
66. Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 54. See also In re Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 681, 685
(1947) (stating "conciliators must maintain a reputation for impartiality, and the parties to conciliation
conferences must feel free to talk without any fear that the conciliator may subsequently make
disclosures as a witness in some other proceeding, to the possible disadvantage of a party to the
conference"); Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding it proper
to deny testimony of mediator in negotiations between union and county based on "policy of promoting
successful mediation" in labor disputes).
67. McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
68. Id. at 807.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 809.
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mediator testimony of a purported mediation agreement.7 The court declined to
follow, however, stating that because the wife had alleged "duress and intimidation"
during the mediation, she waived her statutory privilege to confidentiality.72
Therefore, the wife was precluded from disallowing the mediator's testimony which
might otherwise benefit the husband." In applying such a strict waiver of rights, the
court relied on Florida's "Dead Man's Statute," which mandates waiver of a party's
privileges when that party "open[s] the door" to otherwise excluded evidence.74
Contrary to the broad standard applied in McKinlay is the less generous standard
75
proposed in the March 2000 draft of the Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA").
Section 8(b)(2) of the UMA provides no confidentiality privilege for evidence
offered "in a proceeding in which fraud, duress, or incapacity is in issue regarding
the validity or enforceability of an agreement. . . " except when the "evidence is
provided by persons other than the mediator of the dispute at issue."76 In addition,
all parties to the mediation may waive their privileges under section 6(a), but a
mediator's privilege may not be waived unless the mediator and the parties expressly
waive the privilege under section 6(b)." As noted in the Reporter's Working Notes
("Notes") to the UMA, there exists a separate mediator's privilege in order to
"protect the institution rather than the client's expectations."" This is further
illustrated by the Notes regarding section 5(d), which state that even if all parties
agree to disclose, the mediator may "decline to testify and protect against disclosure
of the mediator's communications. 79
2. Criminal Cases
The most common exception to a mediation privilege arises in criminal cases,
where the constitutional need for mediator testimony in order to impeach or crossexamine a witness outweighs any benefit to the mediation process in suppressing
mediator testimony. 0 Although few cases have arisen with this issue, it appears that
if the defendant wishes to invoke her mediation privilege, courts will deny the
mediation testimony; however, if the defendant seeks to compel testimony, the
mediation testimony will be granted."'

71. Id. at 809-10. See Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7, 8-9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
introduction of evidence of mediation negotiations violated the "spirit and letter" of the confidentiality
provisions).
72. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d at 810.
73. Id. But see Kenney v. Emge, 972 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that Missouri
statute requires denial of mediator's testimony, even to prove existence of mediation agreement).
74. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d at 810.
75. U.M.A. § 8.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 6. Waiver and Estoppel, states: "(a) The disputant's privilege ... may be waived, but only
if expressly waived by all disputants .... (b) The mediator's privilege .... may be waived, but only if
expressly waived by all disputants and the mediator . . .- Id.
78. Id. § 5 reporter's notes (6)(b)(ii).
79. Id. § 5 reporter's notes (6)(a).
80. See Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155, 161-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
81. See generally United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Rinaker, 62 Cal.
App. 4th at 161; State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2000/iss2/11

8

2000]

Bailey: Bailey: Mediator's Privilege
The Mediator's Privilege

The early case of United States v. Gullo involved the issue of mediator
testimony in a criminal proceeding. 82 In Gullo, defendant Gullo participated in a
mediation proceeding sponsored by the New York court system. 3 In a subsequent
grand jury investigation, the prosecution sought and obtained the testimony of the
mediator.8 4 Gullo argued that the testimony was privileged, and therefore, his
resulting indictment should be dismissed. 5 The court ultimately ruled that the
testimony should be suppressed at trial, although the testimony to the grand jury was
not sufficiently prejudicial to dismiss the indictment.8 6 The court based its decision
partly on the need for confidentiality in mediation in order to support "candor" and
an "atmosphere without restraint and intimidation. 8' 7 However, the court noted that
there is a "strong policy in favor of full development of facts and admissibility in
criminal cases." ' This exception for the admissibility of evidence in criminal
proceedings served as the foundation for the recent decision in Rinaker v. Superior
Court.s9
In Rinaker, the California Court of Appeals held that a mediator can be
compelled to testify when the testimony is needed to ensure the constitutional right
to cross-examination and impeachment of a witness under a two-part balancing
test.90 Rinaker revolved around a mediation involving the mediator, Rinaker; two
juveniles charged with vandalism and harassment; and Torres, the victim of the
alleged actions by the juveniles. 9' The mediation produced an agreement as to the
civil harassment action brought by Torres.92 In a subsequent juvenile proceeding,
which is deemed a civil action under California law, the juveniles sought Rinaker's
testimony in order to impeach Torres' testimony.93
The court first acknowledged the strict protection of mediation communications
mandated by section 1119 of the California Evidence Code. 94 The court stated that
even though the need for confidentiality is great, this need must be balanced against
"preventing perjury" and "preserving the integrity of the truth-seeking process of
trial ... ."9' The court noted, though, that an in camera proceeding may be held
before the mediator is questioned at trial so that the "constitutional need" for the
mediator's testimony may be weighed against the mediator's privilege. 9, If the in

82. 672 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
83. Id.at 102.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 103.
86. Id. at 104. But see State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480,482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that criminal defendant may compel mediator's testimony).
87. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. at 104.
88. Id.
89. 62 Cal. App. 4th 155.
90. Id. at 161. See also U.M.A. § 5 reporter's notes (6)(c).
91. Rinaker, 62 Cal App 4th at 161-62.
92. Id. at 162.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 163-64. Section 1119 states: "(a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made..
in... a mediation ...is admissible ... and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled ....
(c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussion by and between participants in the course
of a mediation ... shall remain confidential." Cal. Evid. Code § 1119 (West 1999).
95. Rinaker, 62 CAl. App. 4th at 167.
96. Id. at 169-71.
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camera proceeding produced testimony that could impeach or be used to crossexamine Torres, then the use of Rinaker's testimony would be necessary to ensure
that the juveniles' constitutional rights would not be abrogated.97

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the present case, the court first considered the choice of law issue and
analyzed Olam's desire that federal law apply based on pendent jurisdiction due to
the federal TILA claim.9" Olam argued that under Folb, privilege issues
contemporaneous with the merits of a federal claim are to be decided under federal
law, which is the federal common law of privilege. 99 In response, the court further
suggested a related argument Olam could have proffered involving the ADR Act,
namely that it requires all district courts to adopt a rule providing for confidential
mediations and prohibiting "disclosure of confidential dispute resolution
communications."' The court rebutted the above arguments, however, stating that
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 still existed and was applicable to the present facts.'0 '
Rule 501 requires that state privilege law be applied when the issue before the
court is purely a state and civil matter. 0 2 The court peremptorily noted that
Congress' motion to enforce the mediation settlement is clearly a civil matter in
which state law provides the rule of decision.0 3 Therefore, given the consequence
of Rule 501, California privilege law applies.' °4 The court further stated that given
the facts of the case, the parties should have realized that there existed the possibility
of a proceeding, decided under state law, which would determine whether the
mediation produced an enforceable contract.'°5
In arguing that Olam is not unduly prejudiced by the court's decision, the court
pointed to California's "strong statutory protections for mediation
communications."' 6 The court intimated that these protections are as strong or

97. Id. at 169.
98. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. Note that the court discussed three additional matters regarding
choice of law: (1) the applicable law regarding Olam's underlying claims, one of which was a federal
matter; (2) the applicable law regarding whether the mediation resulted in an enforceable contract; and
(3) the applicable law regarding procedural issues, such as whether or not to hold an in camera
proceeding. Id.at 1119, 1126-27.
99. Id. at 1120. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (holding that a mediation privilege exists under the
federal common law of privilege).
100. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §
652(d) (1998).
101. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
102. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states that "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness... shall be determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. EvID. 501.
103. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. In addition, the court noted that a party may only seek to enforce
mediations that produce a "writing that appears to constitute an enforceable contract." Id.at 1125.
104. Id.at 1121.
105. Id.at 1121-22. The "facts" the court refers to probably include the longevity of the dispute
between the parties, the fact that a date for mediation had been canceled once, and Olam's previous
claims of economic and mental duress.
106. Id. at 1122.
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stronger than the protections Olam would have been afforded under the federal
common law of privilege outlined in Folb.'°7 In addition, if Olam wished to argue
that the newly adopted ADR Act supplanted the scope of Rule 501, Olam would
have to prove that the United States Congress clearly intended to do so.'O°
Otherwise, the considerable importance of Rule 501 will not be so easily
disregarded. '09
The court next considered the applicable California privilege law, namely
sections 703.5, 1119, and 1123 of the California Evidence Code." 0 Section 1123
allows for the admissibility of any signed agreement between the parties."'
Therefore, in the present case, the court noted that the MOU between Olam and
Congress was admissible because it was a signed writing.' 12 In addition, the court
reiterated the parties' waiver of their mediation privilege; Olam's waiver consisted
of any "perceptions" or "recollections" by Congress, the mediator, and Olam's
attorney regarding Olam's "appearance, demeanor, condition, and conduct during
the mediation ....I13
Under sections 703.5 and 1119 of the California Evidence Code, a mediator's
privilege is mutually exclusive of a party's mediation privilege.' 4 Therefore, the

107. Id. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164.
108. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §
652(d) (1998). The court, at length, noted that both California's mediation privilege laws and Rule 501
would "pose very little threat to achieving the purposes of § 652(d) [of the ADR Act]." Clam, 68 F.
Supp. 2d at 1125. As previously noted, California's mediation privilege laws are extremely aggressive
in protecting mediation communications. Id. at 1124. In addition, because most states have some type
of mediation privilege and because enforcement proceedings of an alleged mediation settlement are rare,
Rule 501 and § 652(d) should be able to coexist harmoniously. Id. at 1125. However, this might not
be the case if a state were to provide less mediation privilege protection than the local district court. Id.
at 1124-25.
109. Id. at 1123.
110. Id. at 1128. Section 703.5 states: "No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, and no arbitrator or mediator, shall be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil
proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the prior
proceeding .. " CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 1995). Section 1119 states:
(a)No evidence of anything said or any admission made.., in the course of, or pursuant
to, a mediation ... is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence
shall not be compelled, in any... noncriminal proceeding ....
(b)No writing... prepared in the course of,or pursuant to, a mediation ...is admissible
or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled in any...
noncriminal proceeding ....
(c) All communications ... by and between participants in the course of a mediation...
shall remain confidential.
Cal. Evid. Code § 1119 (West 1997).
Section 1123 states: "[a] written settlement agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a
mediation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure.., if the agreement is signed by the
settling parties and ....(b) The agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that
effect." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1123 (WEST 1997).
111. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
112. Id. at 1128-29. The court further noted that if the parties only had an oral agreement, as opposed
to a signed writing, then under California law, the court would be precluded from even considering
whether there was an enforceable contract using "evidence from the mediation." Id. at 1131. See Ryan
v. Garcia, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1007 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1994) (requiring a signed written agreement
of the resolution of the mediation in order to be admissible in future judicial proceedings).
113. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
114. Id. at 1130. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 703.5, 1119.
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parties' waiver of their mediation privilege does not automatically waive the
mediator's privilege." 5 In determining whether a mediator may testify as to what
she observed during a mediation, the court has an "independent duty" under section
703.5 to decide the "competency" of the mediator's testimony.' 6 This
determination, the court stated, was governed by the leading California case
discussing the issue, Rinaker v. Superior Court."' In applying Rinaker's two-stage
balancing test, the court first observed that compelling a mediator to testify as to
what she observed during a mediation "threatens values underlying the mediation
privileges.""' However, the importance of these values is greatly diminished when
both parties have waived their mediation privilege. " 9
The court acknowledged several concerns which caution against compelling a
mediator to testify: (1) "economic and psychic burdens" could dissuade a mediator
who served pro bono or for very little money; (2) a mediator might feel "violated"
by being forced to give testimony against parties with whom she had established "a
relationship of trust," which could "threaten" a mediator's sense of "personal
integrity"; and (3) a mediator's ability to create an "environment of trust" would be
hampered if parties to a mediation knew that their communications might be used
against them in a subsequent case.' 20 These concerns will vary from case to case
depending on the "nature of the testimony that is sought.' 2 Therefore, the court
stated, it is important for a court analyzing the parties' positions using a Rinaker
balancing test to first note the kinds of "techniques and processes" used in the
mediation. 22 If the mediation "focus[ed] . ..on feelings rather than facts," the
mediator's testimony might do considerable harm to the relationship between the
mediator and party and to the mediation process as a whole. 23 The counterargument
is that if the parties and the mediator view the mediation as more
"adjudicat[ive]/evaluative," then the focus on "evidence, law, and traditional analysis
of liability, damages and settlement options" will not undermine the fairness and
reliability of a mediator's testimony.12" The court opined, however, that because the

115. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
116. Id. at 1130-31.
117. Id at 1131. Before proceeding, the court noted an "analytical curiosity" of the Rinaker opinion,
namely that the Rinaker court did not consider section 703.5 in their analysis of a mediator's privilege.
Id. at 1132. The court in the present case concluded, however, that due to the facts at issue, the balancing
test developed in Rinaker would be the same under both sections 705.3 and 1119. See Rinaker, 62 Cal.
App. 4th 155.
118. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d. at 1133. In addition, the court noted that "'without the promise of
confidentiality it would be appreciably more difficult to achieve the goals of mediation programs...
[and] ...some litigants [would be deterred] from participating freely and openly in mediation."' Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1133-34.
121. Id. at 1134. The court further noted that in Rinaker there was more of a need to keep the
mediator's testimony privileged because of the nature of the relationships formed between the mediator
and the parties - that of trust and security. Id. at 1134-35. However, in the present case, that need is
not nearly as great because both parties want the mediator to testify. Id. at 1134. The court noted that
"[in some mediations .... [tlhe neutral may ask the parties to set aside preoccupations with what
happened as she tries to help the parties understand underlying motivations and needs and to remove
emotional obstacles .
I..."
Id. at 1135.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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testimony sought in the present case was more of a "general and impressionistic level
[of Olam's] condition and capacities," the "probable degree of harm" to the
mediation process would be little.' 25
In applying the balancing analysis, the court first noted the interests that might
be harmed (or advanced) by compelling the mediator's testimony were "crucial" and
26
"probative" to the present issue of whether there existed an enforceable contract.'
Without the testimony of the mediator, "justice" might not be served, which would
"threaten values of great significance" to both parties. 2 ' The court observed that this
is in great part due to the mediator being the only source of neutral evidence as to the
2
mental, emotional, and physical condition of Olam during the mediation.'
Therefore, given the probative value of the mediator's testimony, California 29law
allows the court to compel the mediator to testify in an in camera proceeding.1
After the court heard the mediator's testimony, the court stated that it was "well
situated" to make an informed decision on whether the testimony would be of
enough evidentiary importance to outweigh the harm caused to the mediation
privilege and process. 3 The court first noted the applicable California law
regarding a claim of undue influence.' In order to successfully make this claim, the
claimant must show "(1) that she had a lessened capacity to make a free contract and
(2) that the other party applied its excessive strength to her to secure her
agreement."' 3 2 In ruling that Olam was not unduly influenced, the court centered on
the discrepancies between Olam's and the mediator's testimony regarding how long
Olam was left by herself and the amount of communication Olam had with the
mediator.' 33 In addition, the court noted that Olam's doctor testified that Olam had
not seen him about any serious medical condition in or around the time of the
mediation; therefore, the court observed, this evidence tends to abrogate Olam's
version of her extreme medical condition."' Given the testimony of the neutral
mediator, the court ultimately found that Olam's version of the events of the
mediation was clearly incorrect, and that Olam was not subjected to any undue
Congress' motion to enforce the settlement
influence or distress.'35 Consequently,
36
agreement was granted.

125. Id. at 1136.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1136-37.
128. Id. at 1138-39.
129. Id. at 1139.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1140. California law states that "[u]ndue influence consists... ;(2) In taking an unfair
advantage of another's weakness of mind; or (3) In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of
another's necessities or distress." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1575 (West 1982).
132. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1141 (citing Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123,
131-32 (1966)).
133. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1145-47.
134. Id. at 1144-45.
135. Id. at 1146.
136. Id. at 1151.
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V. COMMENT

A. Choice of Law
A considerable portion of the Olam opinion discusses the choice of law issue.
Although the choice of law largely impacts the result of the case, the court's lengthy
discussion on the distinctions between the newly evolving federal mediation
privilege and the well-founded California privilege is misleading and ultimately not
dispositive.' 37 An interested person reading the opinion might conclude that the
choice of law is partly based on the degree of protection afforded by the federal
privilege versus the state privilege. However, as noted previously in Part III(A) of
this Note, the law a federal court must apply is mandated by Federal Rule of
Evidence 501; the desires of the parties and the various protections of the state and
federal laws do not dictate the choice of law.
The legislative history of Rule 501 and its subsequent applications make very
clear that when the rule of decision is state law, state privilege law applies. 38 As the
history states, it is only when there are federal interests to protect that a court should
apply federal privilege law.' 9 When the issue before the court is merely the
enforceability of a contract, which is without doubt grounded in state law, no federal
interests are considered.
It was unnecessary and superfluous for the court in Olam to consider anything
beyond the history and meaning of Rule 501. However, in an effort to justify the
"fairness" of its ruling, the court noted California's "strong statutory protections for
mediation communications."'" Even given California's aggressive protections,
these protections were not strong enough to safeguard the mediator's privilege in
Olam.
B. Mediator'sPrivilege
It is interesting to note that Judge Brazil, the author of the present opinion, is a
leading figure in the rising acceptance and use of ADR.' 41 As such, it would be
unsurprising if his articles and opinions, especially regarding ADR, were given
considerable weight. The sheer volume of scholarly articles about mediation
privileges evidences the legal community's concern and importance regarding the

137. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-25.
138. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
140. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1122, 1124.
141. Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structuresfor the Delivery ofADR Services by Courts: Critical
Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 715 (1999); Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the
Conversation about the CurrentStatus and the Future ofADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J.Disp.
RESOL. 11; Wayne D. Brazil, Protectingthe Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS
L. J. 955 (1988). See also William B. Leahy, Karen E. Rubin, Keeping the 'R in ADR: How Clam
Treats Confidentiality, 17 Alternatives to the High Cost of Litig. 187, 187 (1999) (stating that Judge
Brazil is "an acknowledged expert on court-sponsored ADR").
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mediation process. 42 Therefore, it can be expected that Judge Brazil's present
opinion will receive much attention, both as precedent for the direction in which the
mediation privilege is evolving and as a California case, a state often considered the
upstart of rising judicial change. '
Unfortunately, the opinion fails to apply the law it so strongly claims to protect.
With extremely few exceptions, a mediator is not compelled to testify, primarily to
protect the mediation process.'" However, Judge Brazil forces the mediator to
testify in the present case. Although Judge Brazil notes the strong California
protections of the mediation privilege, he relies heavily on the California appeals
case of Rinaker v. Superior Court. 45 The fallacy of this reliance, though, is that
Rinaker is distinguishable as a normally accepted exception to a mediation privilege,
namely that of a criminal proceeding. In California, a juvenile proceeding is labeled
as civil, yet the process has all the trappings of at least a quasi-criminal, if not a
complete, criminal proceeding.' In fact, the Rinaker court noted the constitutional
considerations in a criminal proceeding, and that these considerations carried over
whether the state
to "proceedings that may result in confinement or
47 other sanctions,
labels these proceedings 'criminal' or 'civil.,"
Judge Brazil, in the present case, declined to distinguish between criminal and
civil proceedings and instead relied on the two-part balancing analysis outlined in
Rinaker. 48 However, he failed to account for the Rinaker court's note that its
analysis was "against the backdrop of the constitutional right to due process of
law."' 49 Hence, it was misguided to apply the Rinaker balancing test to a civil case
with no due process concerns.
In applying the Rinaker balancing test, Judge Brazil talked at length about the
need for confidentiality and the harm against the mediation process if there was not
a mediator's privilege."" He ultimately decided, though, that the mediation process
will not be harmed if the mediator is forced to testify, at least in this particular
case. '' This is partly due to the type of testimony sought: that of perceptions instead
of disclosures. Additional basis for the decision was the fact that both parties wanted
the mediator to testify, and that without the mediator's testimony, the mediation
agreement would have to be vacated.' 52 This last consideration the court noted as

142. See generally Kentra, supra note 56; Kirtley, supra note 55; Knoll, supra note 55; Joshua P.
Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 157 (1994).
143. See generallyWilliam B. Leahy & Karen E. Rubin, Keeping the 'R'in ADR: How Clam Treats
Confidentiality,17 Alternatives to the High Cost of Litig. 187; Richard C. Reuben, Court Issues Major
Ruling on Mediation Confidentiality, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 25.
144. Compare McKinlay, 648 So. 2d 809 (ordering mediator to testify in a civil case) and Eric D.
Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.RESOL. 1 (1986) (arguing
against a blanket mediation privilege), with Kentra, supra note 56, at 722 (stating that "[m]ediation
would not be nearly as effective if the parties were not assured their discussions would remain private").
145. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1131.
146. See Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 164.
147. Id. at 165.
148. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
149. Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 165.
150. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-35.
151. Id. at 1137.
152. Id. at 1136.
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"doing justice" because of the crucial and probative value of the mediator's
testimony."' 3 However, justice and fairness are not always equal, and one result that
might be fair, as in the present case, does not necessarily result in justice to the
mediation process as a whole. If a party can rely on such transparent terms as
"justice," then the integrity of the process breaks down.
In addition, Judge Brazil did not outline a clear application of when a mediator
can be compelled to testify but instead based his ruling on several previouslymentioned considerations. Perhaps this was in a desire to limit subsequent reliance
on the precedent of the ruling. However, it is quite possible that in reality this
opinion will serve as a tool for other judges to compel mediator testimony when the
facts seem to justify such. The law is not based on simple ideals and parties' desires,
though. It is based on reliance of black-letter law, and here, the California law stated
that mediation communications are to be strictly protected in a civil case.
As previously noted in Part III(B)(1) of this Note, the March 2000 draft of the
Uniform Mediation Act supports not compelling the mediator to testify under facts
such as those in Olam."' The UMA's standard is a middle ground in that it allows
for some exceptions to the mediator's privilege, yet does not stretch the privilege to
allow mediator testimony when the situation seems ripe for it.' 55 The UMA limits
any post-hoc judicial analysis, such as Judge Brazil's, while still allowing enough
exceptions so that the mediation privilege does not become a tool for manifest
injustice. In addition, the UMA supports the mediator's privilege as separate and
distinct from that of the parties.1 6 Therefore, even if the parties desired to compel
the mediator's testimony,
the mediator could refuse to testify based on her own
57
mediator's privilege.
The parties going into a mediation need the assurance that what they say will
remain confidential, and the mediator needs to rely on that in order to gain the
parties' trust and respect so that the mediation proceeding can be fruitful.5 8 If the
mediator is not confident that what she and the parties say during the mediation will
not later be compelled, the mediator's job becomes that much more difficult.

VI. CONCLUSION
Olam stands as the next case in an evolution of the current law regarding
mediation. The facts of the case are unique enough to give a solid example of when
state privilege law should be applied in a federal court not sitting in diversity
jurisdiction. However, Olam's significance does not end with another helpful

153. Id.
154. See U.M.A § 8(b)(2) (Proposed Official Draft Mar. 2000).
155. Id. Some of the UMA exceptions allow for mediation evidence when offered to prove or
disprove "professional misconduct" or "abuse or neglect," or to show a "significant threat to public
safety or health." Id. § 8.
156. Id. § 5(d).
157. Id.
158. See Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155. In Rinaker, the mediator argued that if she were compelled
to testify, then "the very atmosphere that serves to promote resolution in mediation would quickly
become a trap for the unwary if proceedings were not kept confidential." Id. at 166.
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pigeonhole of choice of law. Olam further comments on the mediator's privilege,
which some consider the backbone of mediation.
Perhaps it is inevitable that application of the mediator's privilege will become
a tenuous, fact-oriented investigation, even though the law likes a bright-line rule
when it can find one. In this instance, however, it is especially needed so that parties
(and mediators) not trained in the law can apply a bright-line rule that their
communications in the mediation will not be repeated. Travel down a slippery slope
has begun, one which will probably do some damage, albeit possibly minor, to the
integrity of the mediation process. The desire for a "fair" result in Olam has paved
the way for unjust application of mediation statutes in the future.
JENNIFER
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